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GINGLES UNRAVELED:
HISPANIC VOTING COHESION IN SOUTH FLORIDA
NICHOLAS WARREN**
"e Voting Rights Act protects the ability of racial and language minority
groups to elect candidates of choice by prohibiting states and localities from
diluting those groups’ votes when drawing electoral districts. "e Fair
Districts provisions of the Florida Constitution include a similar ban on vote
dilution, plus further protections against diminishing (retrogressing) existing
minority voting strength. A key element of proving vote dilution or
retrogression is that the minority group votes cohesively. Historically,
minority voting cohesion has often been uncontested or easily proven in VRA
suits. But in South Florida, Hispanic citizens are voting less cohesively than
they used to.
"is Article investigates the legal issues that arise when the assumption of
cohesion unravels. First, this Article examines to what extent the Hispanic
community in South Florida is cohesive. It then proposes several alternative
approaches to the vote dilution and retrogression framework to better align
doctrine with the real-world conditions of voters and communities.
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INTRODUCTION
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), as amended, prohibits
“a denial or abridgement of the right . . . to vote on account of race or color”1
or membership in “a language minority group.”2 After voters approved a pair
of citizen-initiated amendments in 2010, the Florida Constitution includes a
similar ban on legislative and congressional redistricting plans “drawn with
the intent or result of denying or abridging the equal opportunity of racial or
language minorities to participate in the political process.” 3 Echoing the
language of the VRA’s now-dormant Section 5, 4 Florida also bars
redistricting plans drawn “to diminish [racial or language minorities’] ability
to elect representatives of their choice.”5

* © 2022 Nicholas Warren.
** Staff Attorney, ACLU of Florida. I wish to acknowledge the contributions and
mentorship of Professor Rick Pildes and Justice Barbara Pariente, as well as the
guidance and support of Kira Romero-Craft and Quinn Yeargain.
1

52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (“No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political
subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color . . . .”).
2

Id. (“[O]r in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 10303(f)(2) of
this title . . . .”); 52 U.S.C. § 10303(f)(2) (“No voting qualification or prerequisite to
voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or
political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to
vote because he is a member of a language minority group.”).
3

FLA. CONST. art. III, §§ 20(a), 21(a) (“[D]istricts shall not be drawn with the
intent or result of denying or abridging the equal opportunity of racial or language
minorities to participate in the political process or to diminish their ability to elect
representatives of their choice . . . .”).
4
5

See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013).

FLA. CONST. art. III, §§ 20(a), 21(a); 52 U.S.C. § 10304(b) (“Any voting
qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect
to voting that has the purpose of or will have the effect of diminishing the ability of any
citizens of the United States on account of race or color, or in contravention of the
guarantees set forth in section 10303(f)(2) of this title, to elect their preferred candidates
of choice denies or abridges the right to vote . . . .”). “[T]hese provisions were modeled
on and ‘embrace[ ] the principles’ of key provisions of the federal Voting Rights Act
of 1965, section 2 (vote dilution) and section 5 (diminishment, or retrogression).” In re
Senate Joint Resol. of Legis. Apportionment 100 (In re 2022 Apportionment), No.
SC22-131, 2022 WL 619841, at *4 (Fla. Mar. 3, 2022) (quoting In re Senate Joint
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Since the landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision "ornburg v. Gingles,6
plaintiﬀs claiming minority vote dilution under Section 2 must prove, among
other things, that the minority group is “politically cohesive” and that the
“majority votes suﬃciently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the
minority’s preferred candidate.” 7 A redistricting plan’s compliance with
Section 5 also depends on the preconditions of minority voting cohesion and
white bloc voting. 8 \e presence of these two preconditions (collectively,
“racially polarized voting”) has often been uncontested in VRA suits, or
treated as a given by the trial courts hearing the claims. 9 \is is partly so

Resol. of Legis. Apportionment 1176 (Apportionment I), 83 So.3d 597, 619 (Fla.
2012)).
6

478 U.S. 30 (1986).

7

Id. at 51.

8

Texas v. United States, 831 F. Supp. 2d 244, 262 (D.D.C. 2011); League of
Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner (Apportionment VIII), 179 So. 3d 258, 287 n.11 (Fla.
2015).
9

See, e.g., De Grandy v. Wetherell (Wetherell I), 794 F. Supp. 1076, 1079 (N.D.
Fla. 1992) (“The parties agree that racially polarized voting exists throughout Florida
to varying degrees.”); Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity Inc. v. Raffensperger, No. 1:21-CV5337-SCJ, 2022 WL 633312, at *54 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 28, 2022) (“All the parties agree
that there is an extremely large degree of racial polarization in Georgia elections.”);
Singleton v. Merrill, No. 2:21-CV-1291-AMM, 2022 WL 265001, at *66 (N.D. Ala.
Jan. 24, 2022) (“[T]here is no serious dispute that Black voters are ‘politically
cohesive,’ nor that the challenged districts’ white majority votes ‘sufficiently as a bloc
to usually defeat [Black voters’] preferred candidate.’ ” (quoting Cooper v. Harris, 137
S. Ct. 1455, 1470 (2017))), prob. juris. noted, sub nom. Merrill v. Milligan, 142 S. Ct.
879 (2022)); Thomas v. Bryant, 366 F. Supp. 3d 786, 805 (S.D. Miss. 2019) (“It also is
undisputed that African-American voters in District 22 are politically cohesive.”), aff’d,
938 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2019), and reh’g granted en banc, 939 F.3d 629 (5th Cir. 2019),
and vacated as moot en banc sub nom. Thomas v. Reeves, 961 F.3d 800 (5th Cir. 2020);
Ga. State Conf. of NAACP v. Fayette Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 950 F. Supp. 2d 1294,
1312 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (“[I]t is undisputed that Fayette County’s African-American
population is politically cohesive.”); Lopez v. Abbott, 339 F. Supp. 3d 589, 609 (S.D.
Tex. 2018) (defendant’s expert agreed Hispanics voted cohesively); Arbor Hill
Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. Cnty. of Albany, 281 F. Supp. 2d 436, 448
(N.D.N.Y. 2003) (“[N]o one has raised a question in this case concerning the political
cohesiveness of the black community in Albany County.”); Cano v. Davis, 211 F. Supp.
2d 1208, 1235 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (“There is little dispute that Latinos in SD 27 vote
cohesively.”); Goosby v. Town Bd. of Hempstead, 956 F. Supp. 326, 334 (E.D.N.Y.
1997) (“There is no dispute that the black voters in the Town are politically cohesive.”);
Vecinos de Barrio Uno v. City of Holyoke, 960 F. Supp. 515, 518 (D. Mass. 1997)

4
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because the paradigmatic minority group Congress had in mind when drafting
the VRA, and which the Supreme Court had in mind when interpreting the
law, was African Americans—who still today vote extremely cohesively in
most elections in most jurisdictions, just as they did decades ago when
Gingles was decided and when the VRA was enacted.10
In South Florida, 11 one minority group—Hispanics12 —are voting less
cohesively than they used to. What once was a solid Republican bloc
comprised mainly of Cuban immigrants has diversiﬁed both ethnically and
politically. 13 \is fact came to the attention of the courts during the last
(“The question [of] whether the Hispanic voters in Holyoke are politically cohesive is
relatively easy.”).
10

Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The
Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L.R. 1833, 1838 (1992)
(discussing the goals of the Voting Rights Act and the early history of its enforcement);
Peyton McCrary, Racially Polarized Voting in the South: Quantitative Evidence from
the Courtroom, 14 SOC. SCI. HIST. 507, 508 (1990) (discussing the goals of the Voting
Rights Act at increasing Black votership); John M. Powers, Statistical Evidence of
Racially Polarized Voting in the Obama Elections, and Implications for Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act, 102 GEO. L.J. 881, 901–07 (2014) (discussing high Black voting
cohesion); Jeffrey Penney et al., Race and Gender Affinities in Voting: Experimental
Evidence 4 (Queen’s Univ. Econ. Dep’t, Working Paper No. 1370, 2016),
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/149096/1/873819381.pdf (same).
11

In this paper, “South Florida” refers to Miami-Dade County, unless otherwise
noted. Often, social science research analyzing South Florida voting patterns covers
additional counties, usually the others that have overlapped with South Florida’s three
majority-Hispanic congressional districts: Broward, Monroe, Collier, and Hendry.
12

This paper uses this term to refer to people of Hispanic, Latino, and Spanish
origin, because (1) principally, polling has consistently found it to be the preferred term
of a plurality of group members, Justin McCarthy & Whitney Dupreé, No Preferred
Racial Term Among Most Black, Hispanic Adults, GALLUP, Aug. 4, 2021,
https://news.gallup.com/poll/353000/no-preferred-racial-term-among-black-hispanicadults.aspx; Luis Noe-Bustamente, Lauren Mora, & Mark Hugo Lopez, About One-inFour U.S. Hispanics Have Heard of Latinx, but Just 3% Use It, PEW RES. CTR., Aug.
11, 2020, https://pewrsr.ch/2XNrKfR; Jeffrey M. Jones, U.S. Blacks, Hispanics Have
No
Preferences
on
Group
Labels,
GALLUP,
July
26,
2013,
https://news.gallup.com/poll/163706/blacks-hispanics-no-preferences-grouplabels.aspx; (2) the class of people the VRA protects is “persons who are [ ] of Spanish
heritage,” 52 U.S.C. § 10310(c)(3); (3) the State of Florida collects race/ethnicity data
from registered voters using the term, Fla. Stat. § 97.052(2)(g); and (4) the Census
Bureau similarly collects information including the term.
13

Matt A. Barreto & Angela Gutierrez, Taking a Deeper Look at Hispanic Voting
Patterns in South Florida, UCLA LATINO POLICY & POLITICS INITIATIVE (Mar. 3,
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redistricting cycle, but its legal implications for the Voting Rights Act remain
murky. In a 2015 ruling adopting new congressional districts for the state, the
Florida Supreme Court found “a lack of Hispanic voting cohesion” in the
region.14 However, the brevity of the court’s analysis and a lack of record
evidence invite more inquiry into the matter. Indeed, the parties in that highproﬁle case took the position that minority voting cohesion was irrelevant to
the legal question at issue, and the court’s discussion was relegated to a
footnote.15
\is article explores the legal issues that arise when the assumption of
cohesion—on which the VRA and Gingles rest—unravels. Building upon
prior scholarship regarding the goals and theoretical foundations of the VRA,
as well as social science research on the electoral and social behavior of South
Florida Hispanics, this paper investigates to what extent that unraveling has
happened, and the implications. By probing how the history and present
conditions of South Florida’s Hispanic community intersect with the
purposes of the Voting Rights Act, this article seeks to draw attention to
weaknesses in the VRA’s doctrinal framework. \ose weaknesses
recommend both statutory and doctrinal changes to better align the law with
the VRA’s goals.
In particular, Hispanic non-cohesion recommends a shift in how the law
deﬁnes the protected class. While “Hispanics” as a whole may not vote
cohesively, subgroups within that umbrella might—voters of Cuban,
Venezuelan, or Puerto Rican heritage, for instance. It is now time to confront
what the law means by “the” Hispanic community, by “persons of Spanish
heritage,” and by “language minorities” more broadly.
\is article proceeds as follows: Part I gives a brief history of South
Florida’s minority communities, including early voting rights litigation. Part
II brings the story forward with an examination of present-day conditions in
2022), https://latino.ucla.edu/research/voting-in-south-florida/, at 1–2; Heike C.
Alberts, The Missing Evidence for Ethnic Solidarity Among Cubans in Miami, 7 J.
IMMIGRANT & REFUGEE STUD. 250, 251 (2009); Pamela S. Karlan, Our Separatism:
Voting Rights as an American Nationalities Policy, 1 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 83, 100 (1995).
14
15

Apportionment VIII, 179 So. 3d at 287.

Oral Argument at 9:58, Apportionment VIII, 179 So. 3d 258 (No. 14-1905),
http://thefloridachannel.org/videos/111015-florida-supreme-court-oral-arguments-theleague-of-women-voters-of-florida-etc-et-al-v-ken-detzner-et-al-sc14-1905/;
Apportionment VIII at 287, n.11

6
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the Hispanic community. Part III reviews and critiques the redistricting
litigation of the 2010 cycle, which provides some of the richest recent
research and analysis of Hispanic voting patterns in South Florida. Part IV
applies the appropriate cohesion analysis—overlooked or misapplied in
recent cases—to the data available. Lastly, Part V explores what noncohesion means for implementing the VRA and what approaches courts and
lawmakers might take in response. In brief, those approaches are (1) staying
the course and treating “Hispanic” as the sole category of relevance for voting
rights; (2) treating each national-origin subgroup individually, under either
the an amended VRA or Florida law; and (3) doing a combination of those
two, disaggregating at ﬁrst but recombining subgroups where voting patterns
allow. \ese alternatives are examined in light of the VRA’s role as a
“common law statute” and Congress’s aim to stamp out discrimination in all
its evolving forms.16
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Over the past sixty years, South Florida has undergone dramatic changes
in its racial and ethnic makeup. Between 1960 and 1990, the Hispanic
population of Dade County skyrocketed from less than 5% of the total, to a
majority.17 Today, the county is 69% Hispanic.18 Hispanic population growth
and immigration are the primary demographic storylines of the largest county

16

See generally Christopher S. Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2: Of Biased
Votes, Unconstitutional Elections, and Common Law Statutes, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 376
(2012); S. REP. NO. 89-162, at 18 (1965), as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2508,
2543 (invoking the 15th Amendment’s prohibition of “sophisticated as well as simpleminded modes of discrimination” to justify the VRA); S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 10, as
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 187 (noting that since the VRA’s adoption,
discrimination has evolved from “direct, overt impediments to the right to vote to more
sophisticated devices . . . .”)
17

Guillermo J. Grenier & Max J. Castro, Triadic Politics: Ethnicity, Race, and
Politics in Miami, 1959–1998, 68 PAC. HIST. REV. 273, 275 (1999).
18

QuickFacts: Miami-Dade County, Florida, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/miamidadecountyflorida/POP060210.
Dade County changed its name to Miami-Dade County in 1997. The two names are
used here interchangeably. Luisa Yanez, Miami-Dade Leaders See Magic in New
Name, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Nov. 15, 1997, https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/flxpm-1997-11-15-9711150484-story.html.
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in the nation’s third-largest state.19
Since the mid-20th century, Cuban immigrants were at the core of that
Hispanic population growth. \e ﬁrst wave of Cuban exiles ﬂed Castro’s
revolution in the late 1950s and early 1960s. \ose “golden exiles,” as well
as the second wave of “freedom ﬂights” in the mid-1960s through the mid1970s, were largely drawn from Cuba’s white, urban middle class.20 \ese
immigrants faced distinct challenges from other minority groups in the
United States, but also enjoyed distinct advantages. Unlike many other
immigrants, Cuban exiles were oﬃcially welcomed to the United States and
had an easy path to citizenship. 21 Importantly, they did not experience
political exclusion and historic discrimination to nearly the same degree as
other minority groups, such as African Americans and Mexican Americans.22
\e Cuban community quickly became well integrated into the economic and
political life of Dade County.23
\e Miami these immigrants arrived in was not racially monolithic to
begin with. Dade County had a substantial Black population, which by the
1960s was strong enough to ﬂex real political power, thanks in part to the
Voting Rights Act.24 In 1968, for example, Dade County elected Florida’s
ﬁrst African American legislator since Reconstruction as well as its ﬁrst
Black county commissioner ever.25

19

County Population Totals: 2020–2021, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/popest/2020s-countiestotal.html.
20

Grenier & Castro, supra note 17, at 275, 279; Alberts, supra note 13, at 251;
Andrew Lynch, Expression of Cultural Standing in Miami: Cuban Spanish Discourse
About Fidel Castro and Cuba, 7 REVISTA INTERNACIONAL DE LINGÜÍSTICA
IBEROAMERICANA 21, 25 (2009).
21

Lynch, supra note 20, at 25.

22

See Samuel Issacharoff, Groups and the Right to Vote, 44 EMORY L. J. 869, 873

(1995).
23

Id. at 892, 898–99; Melvyn C. Resnick, Beyond the Ethnic Community: Spanish
Language Roles and Maintenance in Miami, 69 INT’L J. SOC. LANGUAGE 89, 96 (1988).
24

OFF. OF CMTY. ADVOC., OFF. OF BLACK AFF., THOMAS D. BOSWELL, PROFILE
111 (2007).

OF THE BLACK POPULATION IN MIAMI-DADE COUNTY
25

Erika L. Wood, FLORIDA: AN OUTLIER IN DENYING VOTING RIGHTS 1, 22 n.46
(2016),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/florida-outlierdenying-voting-rights (noting that Joe Lang Kershaw was the first Black member of the
Florida Legislature since Reconstruction); Meek v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 805 F. Supp.
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It would take litigation, however, to ensure Hispanic and Black
Miamians could fully participate in the political process. In 1986, several
Black and Hispanic voters and politicians brought suit against the Dade
County Commission, challenging the board’s at-large election system under
the amended Section 2. 26 \e suit was successful, and transformed the
commission from an eight-member body with one minority member (who
was not the minority candidate of choice), into a thirteen-member body with
six Hispanic, four Black, and three Anglo commissioners.27 Notably, while
the trial court in that case concluded the Hispanic plaintiﬀs had proven their
dilution claim based on the totality of the circumstances, it found that
“discrimination . . . does not signiﬁcantly preclude Hispanics from
participating in the electoral process,” giving less weight to that factor as
compared to others; such as the presence of racially polarized voting,
unusually large election districts, economic and educational disparities, and
campaign appeals to racial prejudice.28
\e bi-ethnic coalition that forced changes to local elections pushed for
more electoral opportunities in the state’s congressional districts too. In De
Grandy v. Wetherell,29 a three-judge district court adopted a new redistricting
plan that incorporated districts from the Hispanic and Black plaintiﬀs’
proposals. Speciﬁcally, the plan drew two new majority-Black districts and
one Black inﬂuence seat, as well as two new Hispanic supermajority
districts.30 \e plan resulted in the election of Florida’s ﬁrst Black members
of Congress since Reconstruction, and its second Hispanic member of
Congress ever.31 Notably, the Wetherell I court did not engage in a detailed
analysis of the plaintiﬀs’ Section 2 claims. It summarily noted a
“longstanding general history of oﬃcial discrimination against minorities,”
but it found only two facts relating to discrimination against Hispanics
967, 978 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (explaining that Earl Carroll was the first Black county
commissioner).
26

Meek, 805 F. Supp. at 969.

27

Daryl Harris, Generating Racial and Ethnic Conflict in Miami: Impact of
American Foreign Policy and Domestic Racism, in BLACKS, LATINOS, AND ASIANS IN
URBAN AMERICA 79, 89 (James Jennings ed., 1994); Meek, 805 F. Supp. at 986.
28

Meek, 805 F. Supp. at 990–93.

29

(Wetherell I), 794 F. Supp 1076 (N.D. Fla. 1992).

30

Id. at 1087.

31

See Adam Clymer, Democrats Promise Quick Action on a Clinton Plan, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 5, 1992), https://nyti.ms/3iSFrBT.
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speciﬁcally: that Florida had only one Hispanic congressperson, and until
recently had no Hispanic state senators.32 \e court did not require statistical
evidence of racially polarized voting (RPV) but remarked that the parties
agreed RPV existed throughout the state.33
By the time of Wetherell I and Meek, the tripartite division between
Hispanics, African Americans, and Anglos deﬁned the political and social
life of South Florida.34 \at tripartite structure drew the attention of the U.S.
Supreme Court in Johnson v. De Grandy,35 in which the Court upheld the
Florida Legislature’s 1992 legislative redistricting. Citing the district court’s
factual ﬁndings—which to date provide the most detailed legal analysis of
South Florida voting patterns—the Court noted “political cohesion within
each of the Hispanic and black populations but none between the two.”36 \e
district court further noted the Hispanic population’s atypical political
makeup: “more conservative and much more Republican” than elsewhere in
the U.S.37
Even in the early 1990s, however, the Hispanic electorate was not
monolithic. \at fact too did not escape the court’s notice. 38 While Dade
County’s Hispanic electorate was predominantly Republican Cuban
American, Nicaraguans, Colombians, Peruvians, Hondurans, Guatemalans,
Puerto Ricans, and others from elsewhere in Latin America constituted a solid
minority—over two-ﬁfths—of the Hispanic electorate in Dade County at the
time.39 Signiﬁcantly, the court, and the expert witness on whose testimony it
relied, did not assume political cohesion between Cuban and non-Cuban
Hispanics. For certain groups, in fact, it noted political dissimilarities. Puerto

32

Wetherell I, 794 F. Supp. at 1079.

33

Id.

34

De Grandy v. Wetherell (Wetherell II), 815 F. Supp. 1550, 1572 (N.D. Fla.
1992) (“[T]he division of the three major ethnic groups has led to the development of
tripartite politics in Miami; that is, ethnic factors between the three communities
predominate over all other factors in Dade politics.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub
nom. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994).
35

512 U.S. 997 (1994).

36

Id. at 1003 (citing Wetherell II, 815 F. Supp. at 1569).

37

Wetherell II, 815 F. Supp. at 1570.

38

See id.

39

According to the 1990 Census, Cubans constituted over 59% of Dade County’s
Hispanic voters. See id.

10
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Rican registrants were majority Democratic, for example, while Hispanic
registrants overall were nearly 70% Republican. 40 And while the court
ultimately concluded there was suﬃcient cohesiveness among all Hispanics
to satisfy the second Gingles prong, it hedged that “there might be diﬀerences
between the several Hispanic subgroups.”41
II. THE SOUTH FLORIDA HISPANIC COMMUNITY TODAY
Wetherell II and Johnson v. De Grandy were the last judicial rulings on
Hispanic voting patterns in South Florida until the extended redistricting
litigation following the 2010 Census.42 Since those cases were decided in the
early 1990s, however, the political landscape in South Florida changed
dramatically. In 2006, Luis Garcia Jr. became the ﬁrst Democrat to represent
a majority-Hispanic Dade legislative district under the 2002 Republicandrawn maps.43 In 2012, one of South Florida’s three Hispanic congressional
districts elected a Democrat for the ﬁrst time, by an eleven-point margin.44 In
2016, South Florida’s Hispanic Democratic state house delegation grew to

40

See id. at 1570–71.

41

Id. at 1571.

42

That being said, in the course of rejecting a Section 2 suit claiming that the post2000 redistricting diluted the Black vote, a three-judge district court noted that Florida’s
two Hispanic-majority congressional districts elected Hispanic candidates of choice
throughout the 1990s. Martinez v. Bush, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1300 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
The court further found that the three Hispanic-majority districts drawn in the 2002 plan
would likely perform for Hispanic candidates of choice. Id. at 1301. That was the extent
of the court’s discussion of Hispanic voting patterns. It is unclear if the court considered
evidence of Hispanic voting cohesion or any RPV analysis focusing on Hispanic voters.
43

ROBERT E. CREW, JR. WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF SLATER BAYLISS, THE 2010
ELECTIONS IN FLORIDA 117 (2013). The Cuban-born Garcia was elected to three terms
in total. Id.
44

Cuban American Joe Garcia defeated Cuban American incumbent David
Rivera. Patricia Mazzei & Amy Sherman, In South Florida Congressional Races,
David Rivera Loses to Joe Garcia, Allen West Appears to Fall to Patrick Murphy, MIA.
HERALD (Nov. 7, 2012), https://www.miamiherald.com/article1944340.html; Scott
Hiaasen & Patricia Mazzei, Changes in District Helped Lead to Rep. David Rivera’s
Defeat,
MIA.
HERALD
(Nov.
7,
2012),
https://www.miamiherald.com/article1944366.html; Patricia Mazzei, Cuba Politics
Maze Traps Joe Garcia, Carlos Curbelo, MIA. HERALD (Oct. 30, 2014),
http://www.miamiherald.com/article3470631.html.
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three members,45 while a Cuban American Democratic state representative
defeated a three-term incumbent Cuban American Republican state senator,
becoming the ﬁrst Democrat elected from a Hispanic Dade Senate seat in
over thirty years. 46 A year later, a Colombian-born candidate became the
second.47 And 2018 saw a pair of Anglo Democrats win high-proﬁle races
against Cuban Americans in Hispanic-majority districts: Donna Shalala in
the 27th congressional district, and Eileen Higgins in the Little Havanacentered county commission district that Cuban Republicans sued to get
thirty years earlier in Meek.48 All these candidates were elected from districts

45

See Jessica Bakeman, GOP Incumbents Prevail to Keep Large Majority in
Florida House, but Democrats Pick up Seats, POLITICO (Nov. 8, 2016),
https://politi.co/3nALn6h; Mary Ellen Klas, David Rivera Loses Challenge; Robert
Asencio
Joins
Legislature,
MIA.
HERALD
(Nov.
22,
2016),
https://www.miamiherald.com/article116537413.html.
46

Mary Ellen Klas et al., Diaz de la Portilla and Bullard Defeated in State Senate
Upsets,
MIA.
HERALD
(Nov.
8,
2016),
http://www.miamiherald.com/article113508138.html; Patricia Mazzei, Democratic
State Senator Plans to Run for Ros-Lehtinen’s Seat in Congress, MIA. HERALD (May
9, 2017), http://www.miamiherald.com/article149408974.html. In 2020, Senator José
Javier Rodríguez lost reelection to a Cuban American Republican by 32 votes.
Samantha J. Gross, No-Party Candidate in Miami Election Fraud Case Takes Plea
Deal,
Apologizes
to
Voters,
MIAMI HERALD
(Aug.
24,
2021),
https://www.miamiherald.com/article253696658.html.
47

Annette Taddeo defeated Cuban American State Representative Jose Felix Diaz
in a September 2017 special election. Suzanne Gamboa, Annette Taddeo Wins Election,
First Latina Democrat in Florida State Senate, NBC NEWS (Sept. 27, 2017),
https://nbcnews.to/33NJaN6; Fabiola Santiago, Legislator Shed Beard and Deleted
Inaugural Photo with Trump. Voters Weren’t Fooled, MIAMI HERALD (Sept. 28, 2017),
http://www.miamiherald.com/article176007441.html.
48

Lesley Clark & Rene Rodriguez, Donna Shalala Defeats Maria Elvira Salazar,
Flips Congressional Seat for Democrats, MIA. HERALD (Nov. 6, 2018),
https://www.miamiherald.com/article220785310.html; Douglas Hanks, Eileen Higgins
Wins Miami-Dade Commission Seat in Upset Over Zoraida Barreiro, MIAMI HERALD
(June 20, 2018), https://www.miamiherald.com/article213376864.html. Additionally,
Ecuadorian-born Democrat Debbie Mucarsel-Powell defeated Cuban American
incumbent Carlos Curbelo in the 26th congressional district; she lost reelection by less
than four points. Alex Daugherty & Jimena Tavel, Democrat Debbie Mucarsel-Powell
Defeats Republican Carlos Curbelo, MIA. HERALD (Nov. 7, 2018),
https://www.miamiherald.com/article220860675.html; Alex Daugherty, Carlos
Gimenez Defeats Debbie Mucarsel-Powell in Florida’s 26th District (Nov. 4, 2020),
https://www.miamiherald.com/article246864797.html.

12

NORTH CAROLINA CIVIL RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2

with Hispanic voting-age population and voter registration supermajorities.49
Underscoring the enduring competitiveness of these Hispanic-majority seats,
in 2020 Shalala lost reelection by less than three points while Higgins won
by ﬁve, both in races against Cuban American Republicans.50
South Florida’s changing political makeup has not escaped political and
social scientists. Between 1970 and 1990, the Cuban share of Dade County’s
Hispanic population dropped from 91% to 59%, after an inﬂux of new Central
and South American immigrants.51 By 2019, that ﬁgure had fallen to 52%.52
Residents of South and Central American origin now form substantial
minorities of Hispanics as a whole, at about 14–18% each.53 In terms of their
social background, the non-Cuban immigrants diﬀer substantially from the
Cubans who came before them; Central and South American arrivals tend to
be of lower socio-economic backgrounds and more racially diverse, and they
have fewer established ties to the United States than the early waves of Cuban
49

Florida House of Representatives, MyDistrictBuilder, FLA. REDISTRICTING,
http://floridaredistricting cloudapp.net/MyDistrictBuilder.aspx; The Florida Senate,
Plan
Summary
for
2012-CA-2842,
FLA.
SENATE,
https://www.flsenate.gov/PublishedContent/Session/Redistricting/Plans/2012-CA2842/2012-CA-2842_map_fl.pdf; The Florida Senate, Plan Summary for H000H9049,
FLA.
SENATE,
https://www.flsenate.gov/PublishedContent/Session/Redistricting/Plans/h000h9049/h
000h9049_map_fl.pdf; The Florida Senate, Plan Summary for H000C9047, FLA.
SENATE,
https://www.flsenate.gov/PublishedContent/Session/Redistricting/Plans/H000C9047/
H000C9047_map_fl.pdf; The Florida Senate, Plan Summary for FL2002_HOU, FLA.
SENATE,
https://flsenate.gov/UserContent/Session/Redistricting/legal/Tab_D2_Benchmark_Ho
use_Districts.pdf.
50

Alex Daugherty, Maria Elvira Salazar Defeats Donna Shalala in Florida’s 27th
Congressional
District,
MIA.
HERALD
(Nov.
4,
2020),
https://www.miamiherald.com/article246867257.html; Jimena Tavel et al., Regalado
Ahead as Hardemon, Higgins and McGhee Win Miami-Dade Commission Seats, MIA.
HERALD (Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.miamiherald.com/article246780027.html; 2020
General Election, MIAMI-DADE COUNTY SUPERVISOR OF ELECTIONS,
https://enr.electionsfl.org/DAD/2779/Summary/.
51

Grenier & Castro, supra note 17, at 275.

52

QuickFacts: Miami-Dade Cnty., Fla., supra note 18.

53

Hisp. or Latino by Specific Origin 2019: Miami-Dade Cnty., Fla., U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=b03001&t=Populations%20and%20People&g
=0500000US12086&tid=ACSDT1Y2019.B03001.
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immigrants. 54 In contrast, the “golden exiles” and “freedom ﬂights” who
came shortly after Castro’s revolution were predominantly white, urban, and
upper- or middle-class.55
Separate from the issue of cohesion between diﬀerent Hispanic groups
is the question of cohesion within the Cuban population—and that is not a
foregone conclusion nowadays, either. Miami’s Cuban community shared
robust ethnic solidarity following the ﬁrst and second waves of arrivals, when
the bulk of émigrés were highly educated and socioeconomically
homogeneous. 56 \ese exiles and their families viewed themselves as a
cohesive ethnic group and mobilized ethnic resources to build economic,
social, and political capital in their new home throughout the 1960s and
1970s.57
Recent social science and sociological studies, however, have found a
decline in solidarity over the past three decades. As later waves of Cuban
refugees (“Marielitos” in the 1980s, “Balseros” in 1994, and subsequent
arrivals) changed the makeup of the Cuban American population in Dade
County, the community fractured.58 Intra-Cuban ethnic solidarity declined.59
Having grown up or lived signiﬁcant portions of their lives under Castro,
many among these later waves were more inﬂuenced by Communist
ideology. \ey lacked the preexisting family ties of earlier arrivals, had
diﬀering attitudes toward work, and shared diﬀerent expectations of what life

54

Grenier & Castro, supra note 17, at 275, 284.

55

Id. at 275, 279; Alberts, supra note 13, at 251; Jorge Duany, Cuban
Communities in the United States: Migration Waves, Settlement Patterns and
Socioeconomic Diversity, 11 POUVOIRS DANS LA CARAÏBE 69, 76, 78 (1999).
56

Alejandro Portes, The Rise of Ethnicity: Determinants of Ethnic Perceptions
Among Cuban Exiles in Miami, 49 AM. SOCIO. REV. 383, 395 (1984); Alejandro Portes,
The Social Origins of the Cuban Enclave Economy of Miami, 30 SOCIO. PERSP. 340,
368 (1987); Alberts, supra note 12, at 251; Duany, supra note 55, at 76, 78.
57

Heike C. Alberts, Changes in Ethnic Solidarity in Cuban Miami, 95
GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 231, 236–37 (2005).
58
59

Duany, supra note 55, at 70, 72.

Alberts, supra note 57, at 236; Alberts, supra note 13, at 251; Mireya Navarro,
One City, Two Cubas: Miami’s Exiles: Side by Side, Yet Worlds Apart, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 11, 1999), https://nyti.ms/3ddQxQY. See also MARIA CRISTINA GARCIA,
HAVANA USA: CUBAN EXILES AND CUBAN AMERICANS IN SOUTH FLORIDA, 1959–
1994 (University of California Press ed., 1996).
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in the United States would be like.60 \ey were also more racially diverse—
many were Black or darker-skinned, while earlier waves were mostly white.61
\e majority were working-class and lacked a high school education, and
came from more rural areas than the earlier urban emigrés. 62 After the
Marielitos, the Cuban American community could no longer be considered
unqualiﬁedly homogenous. Duany describes how “the [Mariel] exodus
deepened the rifts between ‘old’ and ‘new’ immigrants. Date of departure
from Cuba—before or after 1980—became a symbol of one’s social status.”63
Alberts goes so far as to say that “[s]ocial, racial, economic, and religious
divisions . . . destroy[ed] practically all forms of ethnic solidarity.”64
\ose social divisions translated into political and electoral
fragmentation, too. Cuban Americans had long registered and voted
overwhelmingly Republican, and the policy preferences of Cuban voters
were marked by substantial cohesiveness into the 1990s.65 But between 2002
and 2013, the percentage of Cubans nationwide who were registered as
Republicans dropped from nearly two-thirds to less than half, while
Democratic registration increased from 22 to 44%.66 General election results
reﬂect that registration trend: in six of seven presidential elections between
1980 and 2004, the Republican candidate garnered over 70% of the Cuban
vote in South Florida.67 In 2008, though, that ﬁgure had declined to 65%, and
by 2012 had dropped below 60% for the ﬁrst time—maybe even below a
majority. 68 Estimates for the most recent presidential elections indicate
60

Alberts, supra note 57, at 239–40.

61

Id. at 240; Duany, supra note 55, at 80.

62

Duany, supra note 55, at 80, 85.

63

Id.

64

Alberts, supra note 57, at 241.

65

Jens Manuel Krogstad, After Decades of GOP Support, Cubans Shifting Toward
the Democratic Party, PEW RES. CTR., June 24, 2014, https://pewrsr.ch/33Lcfsg; Kevin
A. Hill & Dario Moreno, Second-Generation Cubans, 18 HISP. J. BEHAV. SCI. 175, 175
(1996).
66

Krogstad, supra note 66.

67

Hill & Moreno, supra note 66, at 176; Juan O. Tamayo, Did Obama or Romney
Win the Cuban-American Vote?, MIA. HERALD (Nov. 13, 2012),
http://www.miamiherald.com/article1944516.html.
68

Tamayo, supra note 68; Krogstad, supra note 66; Dario Moreno & James
Wyatt, Cuban-American Partisanship: A Secular Realignment?, in MINORITY VOTING
IN THE UNITED STATES 254, 256–57 (Kyle L. Kreider & Thomas J. Baldino eds. 2015).
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improvement for the Republican ticket, with about 54 to 57% of South
Florida Cuban voters supporting Trump in 2016, and about 55 to 69% in
2020.69 \e 2018 gubernatorial and U.S. Senate races saw similar splits of
about 70–30 or less for the Republican candidates. 70 Recent top-of-ticket
elections therefore suggest mixed results with respect to cohesion: some races
with rough parity within the 60–40 range and others with robust Republican
vote shares north of two-thirds, albeit less than the 75% or greater majorities
the G.O.P. could count on a couple of decades ago.71
Finally, a recent report by Barreto and Gutierrez took a deeper look at
Hispanic cohesion in Dade County in thirteen statewide, congressional, and
state legislative races, using precinct-level analysis.72 \e report describes
“two distinct Latino electorates:” a “generally cohesive Cuban community []
that supports common candidates of choice,” and a “second electorate” of
“non-Cuban Latinos” who “demonstrate patterns of majority support for their
candidates of choice.”73 Signiﬁcantly, Barreto and Gutierrez conclude based
on this analysis, “grouping all Latino voters as a single cohesive voting block
is not supported by the data.”74

69

Jens Manuel Krogstad & Antonio Flores, Unlike Other Latinos, About Half of
Cuban Voters in Florida Backed Trump, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 15, 2016),
https://pewrsr.ch/3iNCKlo; Nora Gámez Torres, ‘Invisible Campaign’ and the Specter
of Socialism: Why Cuban Americans Fell Hard for Trump, MIA. HERALD (Nov. 19,
2020), https://www.miamiherald.com/article247233684.html; State Results: Florida,
THE
AM.
ELECTION
EVE
POLL
(Nov.
2020),
https://electioneve2020.com/poll/#/en/demographics/latino/fl.
Another analysis estimated that the two-way Democratic share of the total vote in
predominantly Cuban precincts nationwide dropped 13 percentage points from 2016 to
2020. Yair Ghitza & Jonathan Robinson, What Happened in 2020, CATALIST,
https://catalist.us/wh-national/#pp-toc-608eee40d2225-anchor-0.
70

STEVEN J. GREEN SCH. OF INT’L & PUB. AFFAIRS, 2018 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW
CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA 24–25 (Jan. 7, 2019),
https://cri.fiu.edu/research/cuba-poll/2018-fiu-cuba-poll.pdf; Nora Gámez Torres,
Cuban-American Vote for DeSantis Might Prove Decisive as Race Moves Toward
Recount,
MIAMI
HERALD
(Nov.
10,
2018),
https://www.miamiherald.com/article221439990.html.
71

For example, George W. Bush garnered 75% of Florida’s Cuban vote in 2000.
Tamayo, supra note 63.
72

Barreto & Gutierrez, supra note 13.

73

Id. at 2.

74

Id.
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III. LESSONS FROM THE LAST CYCLE
In 2015, the changing social and political makeup of South Florida’s
Hispanic community became the focus of a voting rights dispute for the ﬁrst
time. In its Apportionment VIII ruling adopting congressional districts for the
state, the Florida Supreme Court suggested “a lack of Hispanic voting
cohesion” in South Florida. 75 \is opinion was the ﬁnal ruling in a suit
brought by the Democratic Party and nonproﬁt groups challenging Florida’s
2012 congressional redistricting plan as a violation of the Florida
Constitution’s prohibition on partisan gerrymandering, and the last in a series
of opinions interpreting the new Fair Districts Amendments.76 With respect
to South Florida, the Supreme Court had earlier struck down three majorityHispanic districts for splitting cities and counties to Republicans’ partisan
advantage.77 \e court then relinquished the case to the trial court to consider
the State’s proposed remedial plan and recommend adoption of a ﬁnal map.78
During the relinquishment, the trial court recommended that the Supreme
Court reject the State’s proposed remedial plan and adopt the plaintiﬀs’
map.79
\e courts were prompted to confront the cohesion question because the
State attacked one of the plaintiﬀs’ districts for diminishing Hispanic voting
strength, in violation of the Fair District Amendment’s Section 5 analog.80
Before addressing whether the proposed remedial plan was retrogressive, the
Supreme Court addressed the threshold question of whether the Hispanic
community satisﬁed the Gingles conditions—and concluded that the State
had not proven the cohesion prong.81 Relying on the relatively evenly split
registration ﬁgures in the district and region, the court concluded that “the

75

Apportionment VIII, 179 So. 3d 258, 286–87 (Fla. 2015).

76

Id. at 373; Jordan Lewis, Note, Fair Districts Florida: A Meaningful
Redistricting Reform?, 5 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV. 189, 214 (2015); FLA.
CONST. art. III, § 20.
77

League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner (Apportionment VII), 172 So. 3d
363, 409–11 (Fla. 2015).
78

Id. at 371–72; Apportionment VIII, 179 So. 3d at 260–62.

79

Apportionment VIII, 179 So. 3d at 261.

80

Id. at 279.

81

Id. at 286–87. Because of the case’s procedural posture, the State had the burden
of justifying its proposed plan. Id. at 261.
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evidence . . . suggests a lack of Hispanic voting cohesion.”82
\e Florida Supreme Court stopped short, though, of determining that
Hispanics were not politically cohesive under Gingles. \e expert testimony
on which the Supreme Court and trial court relied made more explicit
conclusions, however. \ree reports by two experts in the case shed light on
the issue.83 In his two reports, Stephen Ansolabehere found that “Hispanics
vote cohesively in North and Central Florida,” but in South Florida,
“Hispanics show little or no voting cohesion.”84 When analyzing the three
South Florida Hispanic districts, Ansolabehere always characterized them as
having a majority Hispanic voting-age population (VAP) or citizen votingage population (CVAP), but never as districts in which Hispanics have
opportunities to elect their preferred candidate. 85 Such careful phrasing
implies that because of non-cohesion, there was no Hispanic candidate of
choice in these districts, because a minority group can have candidates of
82

Id. at 286–87. Of Hispanic registered voters in the benchmark district, 38% were
Republicans, 30% were Democrats, and 33% were registered with neither party. Within
the four counties that comprised the three majority-Hispanic districts (Miami-Dade,
Monroe, Collier, Hendry), Hispanic registered voters were more closely divided among
Republicans (37%), Democrats (31%), and neither party (33%). Id. at 287.
83

Romo Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Disclosures Ex. A (Stephen Ansolabehere, Expert
Report on Congressional Districts in the State of Florida, Feb. 14, 2013), Romo v.
Detzner, No. 2012-CA-412, 2014 WL 3797315 (Fla. 2d Jud. Cir. Ct. July 10, 2014)
[hereinafter Ansolabehere Trial Rep.]; Romo Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of
Romo Plaintiffs’ Proposed Remedial Plan and in Opposition to Alternative Proposed
Remedial Plans Ex. C (Stephen Ansolabehere, Report on Romo Plaintiffs’ Proposed
Remedial Plan for the State of Florida, Sept. 18, 2015), Romo v. Detzner, No. 2012CA-412 (Fla. 2d Jud. Cir. Ct. Oct. 9, 2015) (relinquishment order) [hereinafter
Ansolabehere Relinq. Rep.]; Expert Report of Allan J. Lichtman, Sept. 18, 2015, Romo
(Fla. 2d Jud. Cir. Ct. Oct. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Lichtman Relinq. Rep.].
The trial court called Lichtman’s report “persuasive” but did not comment on
either of Ansolabehere’s reports. Ansolabehere, but not Lichtman, testified at trial.
Romo, slip op. at 13–15 (Fla. 2d Jud. Cir. Ct. Oct. 9, 2015).
84

Ansolabehere Trial Rep., supra note 84, at 24, 41. Ansolabehere based his
conclusions on exit poll data and ecological regressions from the 2008 presidential and
2010 gubernatorial elections. Id. at 39.
85

Id. at 28; Ansolabehere Relinq. Rep., supra note 84, at 10. In contrast,
Ansolabehere refers to one heavily Puerto Rican—and Democratic—Central Florida
district as one “in which Hispanics have the ability to elect their preferred candidates.”
Id. Unfortunately, this nuance in terms was lost on the trial court, which asserted that,
based on the expert testimony, the South Florida districts “all function as performing
Hispanic districts.” Romo, slip op. at 15 (Fla. 2d Jud. Cir. Ct. Oct. 9, 2015).
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choice only if it is internally politically cohesive.86
Unlike Ansolabehere, the plaintiﬀs’ second expert, Allan Lichtman, did
not directly make a conclusion about Hispanic voting cohesion. While he
analyzed many congressional and legislative races rather than just
Ansolabehere’s two statewide elections, Lichtman merely summarized the
(quite substantial) success of Hispanic candidates in those races, rather than
determining through regression whether those successful candidates were the
Hispanic voters’ candidates of choice.87 It was the success of candidates of a
certain race that inappropriately led him to call all the studied districts
“eﬀective performing Hispanic districts.”88
Notably, the one legislative race for which Lichtman did perform a
regression analysis actually undermines the argument for cohesion. 89
Lichtman analyzed the one district of all the heavily Hispanic districts he
studied which elected an Anglo candidate: Republican State Representative
Michael Bileca.90 Lichtman determined that Bileca was in fact the Hispanic
candidate of choice in that race, but the numbers do not obviously lead to that
conclusion. While Bileca won 77% of the Hispanic vote in the general
86

Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, Administering Section 2 of
the VRA After Shelby County, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2143, 2149 (2015); J. Gerald
Hebert, Redistricting in the Post-2000 Era, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 431, 438–39 (2000).
87

Lichtman Relinq. Rep., supra note 84, at 8–10. Lichtman testified to essentially
the same analysis in the contemporaneous lawsuit over Florida’s state senate districts.
The trial court in that case accepted his opinions, and the case was not appealed. League
of Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner, No. 2012-CA-2842, slip op. at 32–37, 67 (Fla. 2d
Jud. Cir. Ct. Dec. 30, 2015); John Kennedy, Florida Senate Won’t Appeal New District
Boundaries
to
Supreme
Court,
PALM
BEACH
POST,
https://www.palmbeachpost.com/story/news/state/2016/01/20/florida-senate-won-tappeal/6798413007/ (Jan. 19, 2016).
88

Lichtman Relinq. Rep., supra note 84, at 16–17. Contra Thornburg v. Gingles,
478 U.S. 30, 68 (1986) (plurality opinion) (“[I]t is the status of the candidate as the
chosen representative of a particular racial group, not the race of the candidate, that is
important.”) (emphasis in original).
89

Lichtman also performed a regression analysis for one statewide race, the 2010
U.S. Senate election. In that race, Hispanic Republican Marco Rubio garnered between
71 and 79% of the Hispanic vote in the three Hispanic-majority congressional districts,
with the remaining Hispanic vote split between a Black Democrat and an Anglo
independent. Lichtman Relinq. Rep., supra note 84, at 13–15. That election’s peculiar
circumstances (one Hispanic Republican versus two left-wing non-Hispanics) caution
against using it to draw broad conclusions about Hispanic voting patterns.
90

Id. at 11–12.
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election against an Anglo Democrat, he received only 34% of the Hispanic
Republican primary vote—hardly the “commanding majority” needed to call
him the community’s candidate of choice.91 \is is especially so considering
that his 34% ﬁgure does not take into account the Hispanic voters registered
as Democrats or with no party aﬃliation who could not vote in the closed
Republican primary. Moreover, ﬁve losing Hispanic candidates in Bileca’s
Republican primary collectively garnered 65% of the Hispanic vote.92
IV. APPLYING THE COHESION STANDARD
\e Florida courts’ opinions of the last redistricting cycle, the expert
reports from those cases, and the Census, voter registration, exit poll, and
elections data on which those reports rely cannot substitute for a complete
analysis of Hispanic voting patterns. \e VRA does not allow statistical
shortcuts or permit the use of just a few numbers to demonstrate racially
polarized voting.93 Investigating Hispanic voting cohesion with the rigor that
Gingles demands would require not just a “quick and dirty” inquiry into party
registration breakdowns, but also ecological regression or inference analyses
of multiple elections (rather than just a couple legislative and statewide races)
to determine how Hispanics are actually voting.94 It requires going behind the
ethnicity of winning candidates, to look at a range of elections in which
Hispanics run against Anglos as well as co-ethnics.95 It requires looking at
91

Id. at 13; Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights
Act, 117 YALE L.J. 174, 226 (2007) (describing the DOJ’s policy dictating that “[u]nless
a candidate wins a commanding majority of the minority vote in both the primary and
general elections, she cannot be considered the community’s candidate of choice”);
Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Race, Region, and Vote Choice in the 2008 Election:
Implications for the Future of the Voting Rights Act, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1385, 1395
n.44 (2010).
92

Lichtman Relinq. Rep., supra note 84, at 13.

93

Gingles, 478 U.S. at 58 (“there is no simple doctrinal test for the existence of
legally significant racial bloc voting”); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020–21
(1994) (“[n]o single statistic provides courts with a shortcut to determine” vote
dilution); Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 479 (2003) (“any assessment . . . depends
on an examination of all the relevant circumstances”).
94

Justin Levitt, Quick and Dirty: The New Misreading of the Voting Rights Act,
43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 573, 587–88 (2016).
95

Persily, supra note 92, at 221–22; Comment, The Future of Majority-Minority
Districts in Light of Declining Racially Polarized Voting, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2208,
2226 (2003).
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the two-step election process, determining how Hispanics vote in primaries
as well as general elections. 96 Following the DOJ’s former practice in
evaluating preclearance submissions, it even requires looking at “soft” factors
like the opinions of Hispanic politicians and Hispanic civic groups to see if
the community “genuinely” prefers a candidate or just reluctantly supports
them.97
It is clear that no such searching analysis has been made to date, either
in the course of litigation or in the academic literature.98 It is equally clear
that much more research needs to be done. However, we can attempt some
preliminary conclusions about Hispanic voting cohesion based on the data
and research that are available, by applying the correct cohesion standard
overlooked by the Florida courts.
First, exit polls, regression data, and precinct analyses from recent
presidential elections show mainly low or moderate cohesion. In the three
presidential elections between 2008 and 2016, South Florida Hispanics were
about evenly split between the Democratic and Republican presidential
candidates, with no candidate gaining more than 60% of the vote.99 Even in
the 2016 U.S. Senate election, Marco Rubio—a Cuban American Republican
and the incumbent—received less than 55% of the Hispanic vote statewide
96

Sam Hirsch, Unpacking Page v. Bartels: A Fresh Redistricting Paradigm
Emerges in New Jersey, 1 ELECTION L.J. 7, 21–22 (2002); Richard H. Pildes, Is VotingRights Law Now at War with Itself: Social Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80
N.C. L. REV. 1517, 1535–36 (2002); Comment, supra note 96, at 2219; Persily, supra
note 92, at 226–27; Section 5 Recommendation Memorandum from Tim Mellett et al.,
Attorneys and Staff, Voting Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice to Robert S. Berman, Deputy
Chief, Voting Section, Dep’t of Justice (Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter DOJ Memo],
available at https://wapo.st/3lLyqVJ.
97

Persily, supra note 92, at 227; DOJ Memo, supra note 97, at 29, 33–35, 40, 53.

98

It is possible the Florida Legislature itself commissioned such analyses for the
2020-cycle redistricting process, but that analysis has not been made publicly available.
Andrew Pantazi, Florida House Approves State District Maps Without Sharing Racial
Analyses, THE TRIBUTARY (Feb. 2, 2022), https://jaxtrib.org/2022/02/02/florida-houseapproves-state-district-maps-without-sharing-racial-analyses/.
99

GIANCARLO SOPO & GUILLERMO GRENIER, ANALYSIS OF THE 2016 CUBANAMERICAN
VOTE,
SCRIBD,
2
(Dec.
18,
2016),
https://www.scribd.com/document/334539413/Analysis-of-the-2016-CubanAmerican-Vote-by-Giancarlo-Sopo-Guillermo-Grenier-Ph-D; Krogstad & Flores,
supra note 70; Exit Polls: Florida President, CNN (Nov. 9, 2016),
https://cnn.it/3lBzVWq; State Results: Florida, supra note 70.
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against an Anglo Democratic opponent. 100 \at compares to 2010, when
Rubio won about three-quarters of the South Florida Hispanic vote.101 \e
2014 governor’s race saw a similarly divided Hispanic electorate statewide,
with Democrat Charlie Crist garnering less than 60% of the vote.102 \e 2018
top-of-ticket races showed similar breakdowns within the 60/40 range.103 In
2020, exit polls painted a picture roughly akin to 2018 and 2016, while other
analyses based on results in the most heavily-Hispanic precincts (but not
ecological regression or inference analyses) estimated a breakdown closer to
two-thirds/one-third for the Republican presidential ticket. 104 By all
accounts, the swing toward the G.O.P. was fueled not only by a Cuban
reversion, but also by non-Cuban Hispanic voters.105 It remains to be seen
whether that rightward movement will endure in future cycles; if so, to what
extent; and whether it would disrupt a conclusion of noncohesion generally—
or if it means simply that neither party can count on garnering a solid majority
of the South Florida Hispanic voting bloc in any one election.
Considering the known data, few or none of the presidential,
gubernatorial, or U.S. Senate races of the last several cycles, then, have seen
the level of Hispanic cohesion courts have usually found suﬃcient to satisfy
the second Gingles prong. While there is no bright-line cutoﬀ, minority
electorates that split 60/40 are generally non-cohesive.106 At the opposite end,
experts have concluded that divides upwards of around 85/15 demonstrate
cohesion.107
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POLICY & POLITICS INITIATIVE (Jan. 19, 2020), https://latino.ucla.edu/research/latinovoters-in-2020-election/, at 6, 15–16.
105

Alex Daugherty, David Smiley, Bianca Padró Ocasio & Ben Wieder, How
Non-Cuban Hispanics in Miami Helped Deliver Florida for Donald Trump, MIA.
HERALD (Nov. 6, 2020), https://www.miamiherald.com/article246978452.html.
106

See Elmendorf et al., Racially Polarized Voting, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 587, 627,
681 (2016); Persily, supra note 92, at 225; Ansolabehere et al., supra note 92, at 1407.
107

See Hirsch, supra note 97, at 16–17.

22

NORTH CAROLINA CIVIL RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2

Second, Barreto and Gutierrez’s recent research provides the clearest
indication yet that, even if South Florida’s Cuban voters are cohesive in the
elections studied, the Hispanic community overall lacks cohesion. 108
Conducting an ecological analysis of thirteen diﬀerent elections, they reach
the conclusion that there are “two Latino electorates” in the region: a
cohesive, mostly Republican, Cuban electorate that makes up about 45% of
the region’s Hispanic voters, and a non-Cuban electorate representing 55%
of Hispanics overall, and that is more likely to support Democrats. 109
Speciﬁcally, Barreto and Gutierrez list the two-party vote breakdown in
majority-Hispanic precincts across the thirteen elections studied from 2016
to 2020. All fall within the 65/35 range, with eleven races splitting 59/41 or
closer.110 Focusing on the Cuban subset, the study estimates that over 80% of
Cuban voters voted cohesively for certain Republican candidates in some of
the races studied—exhibiting divergent preferences from the remainder of the
Hispanic electorate.111
While this recent research is indeed illuminating, the otherwise lack of
RPV analysis of legislative and congressional elections, or even South
Florida-speciﬁc exit poll data for top-of-ticket races, makes it tricky to draw
ﬁrm conclusions about Hispanic voting behavior further down the ticket.
Nonetheless, the data available points to a lack of overall Hispanic cohesion
in at least some Hispanic-majority districts, even while Cuban and nonCuban voters may exhibit divergent political preferences as cohesive
subgroups.112
V. ALTERNATIVES AND CONSEQUENCES
\e possibility of Hispanic non-cohesion raises the question: how should
voting rights legislation and jurisprudence respond? \is Part discusses three
distinct approaches: First, continuing the course: treating “Hispanics” as one
irreducible classiﬁcation, and accepting the attendant consequences should
proper analysis reveal electoral disunity. Second, diving deeper than the
“Hispanic” category: looking at the voting behavior of its constituent
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national-origin subgroups. However, whether this approach is appropriate
under either the existing Voting Rights Act or Florida’s Fair Districts
Amendments is no certain proposition, and Congress could—perhaps
should—update the statute to adopt this framework. \e third approach builds
on the second, but adds a wrinkle: where appropriate, combining the
subcommunities back together under a coalition theory—also no certain
proposition under existing caselaw. I discuss each approach in turn.113
A. Hispanics as One Group
If further research conﬁrms a lack of voting cohesion among Hispanics
in South Florida, and if the law continues to treat Hispanics together, that
would not necessarily mean the end of the road for the Voting Rights Act visà-vis South Florida Hispanics. It is true that a non-cohesive Hispanic
community would mean vote dilution claims would fail and no changes in
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district lines could be retrogressive. 114 Even considering racial and ethnic
demographics in districting would be constitutionally dubious under
prevailing equal protection jurisprudence. 115 Without the justiﬁcation of
VRA compliance, lawmakers engaged in race-conscious redistricting might
ﬁnd their Dade districts vulnerable to challenge, even though Dade’s
concentrated Hispanic populations would not necessitate contorted district
shapes.116 Florida mapmakers’ discretion to draw the lines as they wished
would be quite constrained, especially since the state constitution forbids an
“it was politics, not race” defense to a racial gerrymandering claim for
legislative districts.117 Politically motivated legislators would ﬁnd it harder to
hide behind VRA justiﬁcations to draw districts favoring their party.118
But as mentioned above, it may be the case that Hispanic voters are
cohesive in certain types of races—local elections, for instance—if not all
races. Likewise, it may be the case that Hispanic voters are cohesive in certain
neighborhoods—the Republican-heavy Cuban areas around Hialeah and the
Tamiami Trail, for instance—if not all areas of South Florida. If so, the
VRA’s and Florida Constitution’s protections against dilution and
retrogression remain operative with respect to certain legislative and local
districts, but perhaps not for congressional districts or in areas where nonCuban voters are more prevalent. Assuming that electoral unity in some races
implies cohesion in all is the kind of stereotyping the VRA rejects and which
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the Equal Protection Clause forbids.119 Mapmakers would have to consider
ethnicity for those elections in which it is salient, but disregard it when
drawing districts with low Hispanic cohesion. If cohesion varies within the
South Florida region, then certain districts may be protected from
retrogression, while others may not be.
What would this mean in practice? Judging by recent endogenous
election results, this approach could cut the number of Hispanic-majority
legislative seats protected from retrogression or dilution from ﬁfteen to six or
fewer. 120 Applying the same cursory review to local government—where
Republican strength has eroded more slowly—paints a diﬀerent picture: of
the eight predominantly Hispanic Miami-Dade County Commission districts,
only two or three might exhibit the noncohesion necessary to lose VRA
protection.121
B. Subgroups Under the Voting Rights Act
All of this raises a larger issue. Regardless of whether there is cohesion
amongst Hispanics as a group in all, some, or no elections, mapmakers and
courts ought to reexamine their use of the category “Hispanic” when drawing
districts and analyzing VRA claims in South Florida. \ere are robust
cultural, economic, and political diﬀerences between the various Hispanic
groups in the area. 122 Recognizing those diﬀerences accords with antidiscrimination law’s goals of combatting stereotypes and rejecting
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assumptions about minority groups. Just as we cannot assume diﬀerence
between groups, we should not assume sameness within groups. Even if
Hispanics as a whole do not vote cohesively, subgroups of certain national
origin backgrounds may. \is approach is practically feasible, as national
origin data is collected by both the decennial U.S. Census and the ongoing
American Community Survey.
Analyzing subgroup behavior raises some legal questions, however. As
an initial matter, by its terms, the text of the Voting Rights Act precludes
going beyond the broad umbrella of the “Hispanic” category. \e VRA does
protect “language minority group[s],” and one could argue that the variations
in the Spanish that Cubans, Venezuelans, and other “Hispanic” subgroups
speak make each a distinct language minority group. 123 But the VRA
speciﬁcally deﬁnes “language minority group” to mean persons “of Spanish
heritage”—rejecting diving deeper than the “Hispanic” umbrella.124
Legal eﬀorts to break up the umbrella for other “language minority
groups” listed in the statute have failed and are instructive for the Hispanic
question. In 1994, a federal district court rejected a Section 2 suit brought by
Yupik Alaskans challenging that state’s legislative redistricting. 125 \e
plaintiﬀs argued the State diluted the Yupik vote in favor of two other
Alaskan Native groups, even though the overall number of Native seats was
unaﬀected. 126 \e court rejected the Yupik plaintiﬀs’ contention that they
deserved independent consideration separate from Alaskan Natives as a
whole, notwithstanding the Yupiks’ distinct dialect or language:
123
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If Congress had intended to create
numerous subgroups and classes of minorities
to correspond to the indeterminate number of
languages and dialects spoken in the United
States, it could have done so. Instead, the
language of the statute is speciﬁc: protected
classes include “American Indians, Asian
Americans, Alaskan Natives or [persons] of
Spanish Heritage.”127
Notably, the U.S. Department of Justice ignored the Yupik argument
during Section 5 preclearance proceedings in the same redistricting cycle.128
While the Yupik case points against breaking up the statutory “language
minority groups,” other courts have seen reason to do just that—albeit not
squarely within the Section 2 context. After the 1992 Arizona Legislature
deadlocked, a federal district court was tasked with redrawing the state’s
congressional districts.129 While there was no American Indian VRA claim
in the case, the court took care to keep two Indian groups—Hopi and
Navajo—in separate districts, “out of respect for . . . the historical tension
and present competition between these two tribes.” 130 A decade later, the
Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission similarly separated the
tribes, and state courts looked on that approach favorably in subsequent
litigation.131
Whether the constituent parts of a protected group can raise VRA claims
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on behalf of their subgroup is clearly not a new issue. 132 But the sparse
caselaw indicates that this question—how to treat homogenous components
of heterogeneous minority groups—remains an “emerging” one, just as
Pamela Karlan described over twenty years ago.133 Nevertheless, given the
apparent rigidity of the VRA’s “Spanish heritage” deﬁnition, it seems
unlikely that a subgroup approach is workable. As Congress debates new
voting rights legislation, lawmakers should consider how to update the
“language minority group” deﬁnition to recognize the true diversity of (and
distinctive identities within) that term. A reworking of the statute to reﬁne the
catchalls “persons who are American Indians, Asian Americans, Alaskan
Natives or of Spanish Heritage” to permit claims by members of individual
tribes and national origin groups would go a long way toward achieving that
goal. Even just adding “ethnicity” as a standalone protected category could
be a workable, ﬂexible solution, giving courts leeway to tailor VRA remedies
to the social and political realities on the ground.
C. Subgroups Under the Fair Districts Amendments and a Coalitional
Approach
In contrast to the Voting Rights Act, Florida’s Fair Districts
Amendments protect “racial [and] language minorities,” without deﬁning
those terms.134 Regardless of whatever amendments Congress makes to the
VRA, the Fair Districts text opens a window for a creative Florida court to
deﬁne either of those terms to include national origin-speciﬁc categories.
Hampering a ﬂexible interpretation, however, is the Florida Supreme Court’s
declaration that the VRA guides their interpretation of Fair Districts, as well
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as Fair Districts’ plain text.135 But facing the realities of collectively diverse,
individually uniﬁed Hispanic subcommunities, the Florida courts could
disregard the VRA, cast aside a constrained deﬁnition of “racial and language
minorities,” and invoke their “independent constitutional obligation to
interpret [their] own state constitutional provisions.”136
Such an approach could better reﬂect the realities of the people in the
world, particularly if combined with a coalitional approach to voting rights
claims, as discussed above. Whether through an amended VRA or
reinterpreted Fair Districts Amendments, a subgroup framework would
provide particularly robust protections if combined with a coalitional
approach to voting rights claims. If diﬀerent subgroups exhibited similar
voting behavior, those communities could be assembled together.
Component communities that might be too small to constitute a majority in
their own single-member district would not necessarily be locked out of a
dilution claim. While the U.S. Supreme Court has never endorsed cross-racial
or cross-ethnic vote dilution claims, other courts have—including the
Eleventh Circuit.137 And notably, the most recent version of H.R. 4, the John
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R. Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act of 2021, explicitly recognizes
claims by “cohesive coalition[s] of members of diﬀerent racial or language
minority groups.”138
But setting aside, for a moment, the prospect of coalitional claims, South
Florida’s demographics throw a wrench into the subgroup strategy. All but
one national-origin group are too dispersed to form a majority in a legislative
or county commission district.139 Cubans are the only community that could
satisfy the ﬁrst Gingles precondition (“suﬃciently large and geographically
compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district”). 140 Even if
national-origin subcommunities were grouped into coalitions, the non-Cuban
population is so scattered that no combination could form a majority in any
type of district. A subgroup approach may be more appropriate than treating
all Hispanics as an undiﬀerentiated whole, then, but the practical diﬀerence
is likely minimal (except, perhaps, for the Cuban American community).
CONCLUSION
\e perfunctory nature in which many courts and litigants gloss over
minority cohesion in vote dilution cases can obscure its importance to the
VRA framework. But racially polarized voting matters because it is itself
corrosive to the democratic process. Without RPV, the discriminatory
mechanisms by which racial minorities’ political opportunities are frustrated
could not operate. 141 Indeed, when minority voters can no longer be
automatically identiﬁed from the candidates and parties they support, the
VRA’s purpose of remedying the lingering eﬀects of discrimination is no
longer salient. If candidate preferences no longer align with race, then at least
in the electoral arena, color-blindness wins the day.
Such an outcome doesn’t punish minority voters for “unremarkable”
voting patterns, nor does it embody a “use it or lose it” attitude about VRA
protections. Because at the point when minority-group voting looks roughly
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like majority-group voting, there’s nothing to “lose:” the “operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities” can
indeed be relied upon.142 Especially in light of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
prohibition on sorting by race, the government shouldn’t be making racial
classiﬁcations without good reason.143 Compliance with the VRA’s results
test is a good reason,144 but only so long as race or ethnicity is clearly salient
in shaping the electoral opportunities of historically disadvantaged groups
and remedying the eﬀects of past discrimination.
So, answering the question of whether South Florida’s Hispanic
community votes cohesively has signiﬁcant implications for how we measure
our society’s progress on the road toward racial equality. While more
research needs to be done, this investigation suggests that for this particular
minority group in this particular context, we are one step closer to leaving
behind the “politics of second best.”145
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